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Abstract
Even though the forecasting literature agrees that aggregating multiple predictions of
some future outcome typically outperforms the individual predictions, there is no general
consensus about the right way to do this. Most common aggregators are means, defined
loosely as aggregators that always remain between the smallest and largest predictions. Ex-
amples include the arithmetic mean, trimmed means, median, mid-range, and many other
measures of central tendency. If the forecasters use different information, the aggregator
ideally combines their information into a consensus without losing or distorting any of it.
An aggregator that achieves this is considered efficient. Unfortunately, our results show
that if the forecasters use their information accurately, an aggregator that always remains
strictly between the smallest and largest predictions is never efficient in practice. A similar
result holds even if the ideal predictions are distorted with random error that is centered
at zero. If these noisy predictions are aggregated with a similar notion of centrality, then,
under some mild conditions, the aggregator is asymptotically inefficient.
Keywords: Judgmental forecasts, Information aggregation, Means, Meta-analysis, Model
averaging
1. INTRODUCTION
Forecasters often use different information in their predictions. For instance, one analyst may
live in Russia while another lives in the United States. If they both follow local news, they are
likely to use very different information in their predictions about global political events. Ideally
their predictions would represent an accurate assessment of their information. In the economics
and statistics literature such ideal predictions are called rational, honest, or calibrated (see,
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e.g., Keane and Runkle 1990; Dawid et al. 1995; Ottaviani and Sørensen 2006; Ranjan and
Gneiting 2010; Jolliffe and Stephenson 2012; Satopa¨a¨ et al. 2016). Note that even though this
paper treats the forecasters as human experts, the discussion is equally valid for other types of
forecasters, such as statistical models.
The predictions are then combined with a statistical aggregator that is nothing but a function
from the predictions to the consensus. This is typically done for the sake of decision making
and improved accuracy. In fact, after summarizing a wide range of empirical and simulated
evidence in the forecasting literature, Clemen (1989) states that “the results have been virtually
unanimous: combining multiple predictions leads to increased prediction accuracy.” In general,
the best that an aggregator can do is to use all information that the forecasters provide through
their predictions. If the aggregator does this without losing or distorting any of the forecasters’
information, it is considered efficient.
There are, however, many different ways to aggregate predictions, and the choice of the ag-
gregator can largely determine how well the consensus performs out-of-sample (Satopa¨a¨ et al.,
2017). Often the first idea is to use a mean, defined here as any aggregator that is bound to
remain between the smallest and largest predictions. This definition is due to Cauchy (1821)
and is probably the least restrictive definition of a mean. Given that in colloquial language
“mean” and “arithmetic mean” (i.e., the sum of values divided by the number of values) are
often treated as synonyms, it is important to emphasize that our scope is not restricted to the
arithmetic mean but instead captures all means including the weighted arithmetic mean, me-
dian, mode, mid-hinge, mid-range, trimmed means, geometric mean, harmonic mean, and
many others.
Today the practice of combining predictions with a mean appears almost ubiquitous. For
instance, central banks use the arithmetic mean or median to combine macroeconomic pre-
dictions of inflation and real output growth (Trabelsi, 2016); the Survey of Professional Fore-
casters by the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia reports the arithmetic mean and median
predictions of real gross domestic product (GDP), unemployment rate, and other macroeco-
nomic indicators; Reuters.com, Yahoo! Finance, Fortune, and other business sites show the
arithmetic mean of analysts’ predictions of financial indicators such as future sales and earn-
ings; and many others. In fact, it is rather challenging to find a real example that does not use
a mean to aggregate predictions.
Unfortunately, if the goal is to find or provide the public with the most informed consensus
prediction, the common practice is falling short. This is because means are not necessarily
efficient. To illustrate with a very simple example, suppose a patient has a magnetic resonance
imaging (MRI) and blood test taken. Two well-calibrated doctors then independently analyze
the results that fortunately show no indication of poor health. The first doctor only looks at
the MRI results and predicts that the patient has a probability 0.9 of being healthy. The second
doctor, on the other hand, only looks at the blood test results but also predicts a probability 0.9
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of the patient being healthy. Now the patient has two predictions of 0.9, each based on very
different information. How should these be combined? Surely, if one looked at both the MRI
and blood test results, one would be even more confident of the patient’s good health and hence
predict a probability somewhat greater than 0.9. In this simple scenario, however, all means
aggregate to 0.9. They fail to account for the doctors’ differing information sets and hence are
inefficient.
Even though this example may appear somewhat contrived, it does suggest an interesting
question: under what conditions are means efficient aggregators of point predictions that are
based on different information? Strikingly, our main result shows that the answer is “almost
never.”
The current paper develops this result with the following structure. First, Section 2 intro-
duces the framework of analysis, gives a brief literature review, and derives the necessary and
sufficient conditions for efficiency (Theorem 2.4). The discussion considers a weak form of
efficiency in a sense that an aggregator is efficient if and only if there exists some probability
space under which it uses all the information in the predictions. Failing to meet this crite-
rion then shows a strong form of inefficiency; that is, an aggregator is inefficient if there is no
probability space under which it uses all the information in the predictions.
Section 3 shows that this type of inefficiency applies to means of calibrated predictions
about continuous (GDP, sales, stock prices), binary (rain or no rain, candidate wins or loses),
discrete (product demand, goals per season), and all other numerical types of univariate out-
comes. The result is developed in two parts:
a) Section 3.1 analyzes arithmetic means. An arithmetic mean is non-trivial and attempts to ag-
gregate information if it assigns positive (fixed) weight to at least two different predictions.
Theorem 3.2 shows that a non-trivial arithmetic mean violates all the efficiency properties
in Theorem 2.4 and is therefore inefficient. More specifically, it distorts the forecasters’
information and is under-confident.
Sometimes the arithmetic mean is believed to be inefficient because it represents the fore-
casters’ shared information too many times (Kim et al., 2001; Palley and Soll, 2015). This,
however, is not an entirely accurate explanation. We show that a linear aggregator faces
a trade-off between under-representing private information (known only to one forecaster)
and over-representing the shared information (known to all forecasters). The efficient strat-
egy balances the trade-off by intentionally over-representing the shared information in order
to under-represent each forecasters’ private information less. The arithmetic mean always
represents shared information optimally but unfortunately under-represents any private in-
formation. This suggests that the arithmetic mean can work well when the forecasters rely
on very similar information; otherwise a relatively large share of information is under-
represented, leading to an under-confident aggregate.
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b) Section 3.2 analyzes the general class of means. This class is not entirely inefficient but if
the definition is tightened slightly such that a mean must stay strictly between the smallest
and largest predictions whenever at least two predictions disagree, inefficiency becomes a
class property. More specifically, Theorem 3.7 shows that these aggregators, that we call
strict means, can be efficient only if the forecasters’ information sets are uncountably large.
Given that in our finite physical universe forecasters use finite information sets, strict means
and hence essentially all common aggregators are not efficient in practice.
Section 4 applies these results in an asymptotic analysis with forecasters who make mis-
takes in interpreting their information and hence report noisy versions of their calibrated pre-
dictions. In other words, each prediction is a draw from a distribution with the center at that
forecaster’s calibrated prediction. If the predictions are aggregated with a similar notion of cen-
trality, Corollary 4.4 shows, under some mild conditions, that the aggregator is asymptotically
inefficient.
Section 5 concludes by discussing our results in the broader context of forecast modeling,
intuitively explaining the reason behind the inefficiency of central tendency, and describing
some of our future work in forecast aggregation.
2. PARTIAL INFORMATION FRAMEWORK
2.1 Predictions and Outcome
The partial information framework is a micro-level model of different predictions (Satopa¨a¨
et al., 2017). More specifically, suppose there are N ∈ N forecasters making point predic-
tions X1, . . . , XN about some future outcome Y . The predictions and outcome are treated as
random variables defined under a common probability space (Ω,F ,P). In general, assum-
ing the existence of a probability space cannot be avoided in any probabilistic treatment of
forecast aggregation. In fact, according to Lindley (1985) this is essential and “any other ap-
proach has an element of adhockery about it [...].” Under the given probability space, define
E(Y ) := µ0 < ∞ and Var (Y ) := δ0 < ∞. This leads to the following assumption about the
outcome:
Assumption 2.1. The outcome Y is defined under (Ω,F ,P) and Y ∈ L2, where Lp := {Z ∈
F : E[|Z|p] <∞}
Each forecaster predicts Y based on some partial information. In mathematics information
is often formalized with σ-fields (Herve´s-Beloso and Monteiro, 2013). This way the trivial σ-
field F0 := {∅,Ω} represents no information and the principal σ-field F represents all possible
information that can be known about Y . The jth forecaster, however, knows some partial
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information set Fj ⊆ F . No assumption as to how the forecaster acquired this information is
needed. For instance, it could have stemmed from books, news articles, personal recollections,
and so on (see Satopa¨a¨ et al. 2016 for futher discussion). These details are not relevant for
aggregation and hence can be abstracted away.
The jth forecaster first forms a conditional distribution P(Y |Fj). How the forecaster then
converts this distribution into a point prediction Xj depends on the loss function L(X, Y )
used for evaluating prediction accuracy. The partial information framework assumes that the
forecasters aim to minimize the expected Bregman loss, defined as follows: if φ : R → R is
a strictly convex, differentiable function, then the Bregman loss function is L(x, y) = φ(x) −
φ(y)− (x− y)φ′(y). For instance, φ(x) = x2 gives the squared error loss L(x, y) = (x− y)2.
In general, if φ is continuously differentiable, then Bregman loss functions are precisely those
functions whose expected value is minimized by E(Y |Fj) among all Fj-measurable random
variables, i.e., arg minX∈Fj E[L(X, Y )] = E(Y |Fj). This leads to the following assumption
about the predictions:
Assumption 2.2. The prediction Xj = E(Y |Fj) a.s. for some Fj ⊆ F .
In practice the forecasters may not use all the information they know about Y . For instance,
they may not be able to reconcile all the available information or they may conceal some of it
for various reasons. Either way, the aggregator can access and operate only on the information
that the predictions reveal to it. Therefore, for the sake of aggregation, any unused information
may as well not exist, and it is in no way restrictive to set Fj = σ(Xj) and let Xj = E(Y |Xj)
a.s.
This condition, typically known as calibration, is a common assumption in theoretical anal-
ysis of forecasting (see, e.g., Keane and Runkle 1990; Dawid et al. 1995; Ranjan and Gneiting
2010; Jolliffe and Stephenson 2012; Satopa¨a¨ et al. 2016). Calibration is equivalent to Assump-
tion 2.2; that is, a prediction Xj is calibrated if and only if there exists some information set
Fj ⊆ F such that X = E(Y |Fj) a.s. (Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2016). Given that our definition of
calibration depends on the probability measure P, it may seem different from the widely stud-
ied notion of empirical calibration (Dawid 1982; Foster and Vohra 1998; and many others).
However, as was pointed out by Dawid et al. (1995), these two definitions of calibration can
be expressed in formally identical terms by letting P represent the limiting joint distribution of
the outcome-prediction pairs.
To illustrate calibration, consider a probability prediction Xj ∈ [0, 1]. If the outcome hap-
pens 100p% of the time among all those times that Xj = p, then the prediction is calibrated.
This is precisely how probabilities are generally understood. Most forecasters with a basic un-
derstanding of probabilities are likely to target good calibration even without being instructed
to do so. In fact, previous studies have found many calibrated subpopulations of experts, such
as meteorologists (Murphy and Winkler, 1977), experienced tournament bridge players (Keren,
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1987), bookmakers (Dowie, 1976), and economic forecasters (Keane and Runkle, 1990).
On the more theoretical side, Dawid (1982) show that an internally consistent Bayesian can
expect to become calibrated under feedback. Foster and Vohra (1998) show that the forecaster
needs to know almost nothing about the outcome in order to be calibrated. If one is nonetheless
left with uncalibrated predictions, it may be possible to calibrate them either empirically or with
an appropriate model (Dawid et al., 1995; Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2017). Furthermore, the calibration
of human forecasters can be improved through team collaboration, training, tracking (Mellers
et al., 2014), timely and accurate feedback (Murphy and Daan, 1984), representative sampling
of target events (Gigerenzer et al., 1991; Juslin, 1993), breaking the task into smaller more
manageable sub-parts (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016), or by evaluating the forecasters under a
Bregman loss function (Banerjee et al., 2005).
2.2 Efficient Aggregators
Throughout this paper aggregators are denoted with different variants of the script symbol X .
An aggregator is simply any prediction that is measurable with respect toF ′′ := σ(X1, . . . , XN),
namely the σ-field of all information that can be inferred from the reported predictions (Ranjan
and Gneiting, 2010). If the aggregator uses all of this information, it is called efficient. The
following definition makes this precise.
Definition 2.3 (Efficiency). An aggregator X is efficient if there exists a probability space
(Ω,F ,P) under which X = E(Y |X1, . . . , XN) a.s. or, equivalently, X = E(Y |F ′′) a.s. with
F ′′ = σ(X1, . . . , XN). Denote all efficient aggregators with X ′′.
In regression analysis X ′′ is known as the regression function and is often considered the
best predictor of Y (see, e.g., Christensen 2011, Theorem 6.3.1) because it minimizes the
expected Bregman loss (Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2017). Unfortunately, Definition 2.3 is rather abstract
and does not render itself well to analysis. In response, the next theorem fully characterizes
efficient aggregators in terms of two necessary and sufficient properties. These properties form
a “toolbox” for showing that some aggregator is not efficient. In particular, violating any of the
properties shows a strong form of inefficiency: there is no probability space under which the
aggregator is efficient. The proofs of this and all other theorems are deferred to the Appendix.
Theorem 2.4. An aggregator X of calibrated predictions X1, . . . , XN is efficient if and only if
it has the following two properties.
(i) X is calibrated: E(Y |X ) = X a.s.
(ii) X is extremizing: Var [E(Y |Xj, j ∈ v)] ≤ Var (X ) for all subsets v ⊆ {1, . . . , N}.
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Item (i) does not require calibrated predictions. In fact, an efficient aggregator, like any
conditional expectation, is always calibrated. Given that X ′′ is calibrated, it is also marginally
consistent: E(X ′′) = E(Y ) = µ0. To see this, consider a calibrated prediction X . Then
E(X) = E[E(Y |X)] = E(Y ) = µ0. Consequently, all calibrated predictions (individual or ag-
gregate) are marginally consistent. The converse, however, is not true. For instance, Theorem
3.2 shows that any non-trivial arithmetic mean is marginally consistent but not calibrated. This
is an important observation because it provides a technique for proving lack of calibration (and
hence inefficiency) via marginal inconsistency – a task that can be much easier than proving
lack of calibration directly.
Item (ii), on the other hand, requires calibrated predictions. To interpret this property,
suppose the forecasters’ information sets form an increasing sequence {∅,Ω} = F0 ⊆ F1 ⊆
· · · ⊆ FN ⊆ F . Note that E(Y |F0) = µ0 and E(Y |F) = Y . Satopa¨a¨ et al. (2017) show that
the variances of these predictions follow the same order as their nested information sets, that is,
0 = Var (X0) ≤ Var (X1) ≤ · · · ≤ Var (XN) ≤ Var (Y ) = δ0. Thus the informativeness of
a calibrated prediction increases in its variance. Naturally, if an aggregator is efficient, it uses
all of the forecasters’ information and hence at least as much information as any subgroup of
these individuals. Therefore X ′′ is necessarily at least as variable as every individual prediction
or, more generally, the efficient aggregate of any subset of them. This is precisely what item
(ii) describes.
2.3 Literature Review
One of the earliest inefficiency results is by Nobel laureate C. W. J. Granger who empha-
sized the importance of forecasters’ information in both theory and interpretation of predic-
tions (Granger, 1989). He shows that the equally weighted arithmetic mean is an inefficient
aggregator of calibrated predictions if each forecaster’s information consists in equal parts of
shared and private information. Later on, Kim et al. (2001) reached the same conclusion.
Real-world forecasters, however, can have different amounts of information, and not all
information is either completely shared or private. For instance, two forecasters may share
information that a third forecaster does not know and so on. This way the forecasters’ infor-
mation can be seen to form a complex structure of partially overlapping sets.
By operating under the partial information framework, it is possible to analyze aggregation
without constraining the information structure. Some previous authors have taken this ap-
proach to examine calibrated forecasting of binary outcomes. In particular, Dawid et al. (1995)
show that the weighted arithmetic mean of two calibrated predictions of a binary outcome is
always inefficient as long as one forecaster does not know everything that the other forecaster
knows. This result was later on extended to N ≥ 2 calibrated predictions of a binary outcome
(Hora, 2004; Ranjan and Gneiting, 2010; Gneiting et al., 2013).
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Parunak et al. (2013) attempt to generalize beyond the arithmetic mean. They suppose that
all forecasters know equally much and that not all information about a binary outcome can
be known. They then consider an omniscient prediction that optimally uses all information
that could possibly be known. They illustrate that this prediction can be outside the the con-
vex hull of the individual calibrated predictions. The omniscient prediction, however, is not an
aggregator as it is not a function of the predictions (or measurable with respect to F ′′). Further-
more, it is always based on at least as much (and often more) information than the individual
predictions combined. Therefore it is not clear how directly these results relate to forecast
aggregation. Their work, however, did inspire us to look for a general inefficiency result.
In summary, existing general inefficiency results are limited to binary outcomes and the
arithmetic mean of their calibrated predictions. Importantly, in each case the weights in the
arithmetic mean are fixed ex-ante before the predictions are observed. Therefore the results do
not apply to many common means such as the median or trimmed means. The discussion has
also remained rather technical with no attempt to intuitively explain the reason or phenomenon
behind the inefficiency.
Part of our goal now is to settle this general conversation around inefficiency. First, we
show that the inefficiency is not limited to the arithmetic mean of calibrated predictions of a
binary outcome but instead applies to almost all means of calibrated predictions of any type
of (univariate) outcome. Second, we intuitively explain the reasons behind this inefficiency.
Third, to the best of our knowledge, we are the first to discuss the inefficiency of the means in
the context of uncalibrated predictions.
3. AGGREGATING CALIBRATED PREDICTIONS
3.1 Arithmetic Mean
The (weighted) arithmetic mean is the most common way to combine predictions in practice
(Hora, 2004; Ranjan and Gneiting, 2010; Jose et al., 2013). Therefore it is a natural starting
point in our analysis of the means. The arithmetic mean is defined and notated as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Arithmetic Mean). An arithmetic mean is Xw :=
∑N
j=1wjXj , where each
weight wj ≥ 0 is fixed and
∑N
j=1wj = 1. It is non-trivial if there exists a pair i 6= j such that
P(Xi 6= Xj) > 0 and wi, wj > 0.
Similarly to the previous studies mentioned in Section 2.3, the weights here cannot depend
on the realized values of the predictions. Instead, they must be fixed before the predictions are
observed. The non-triviality condition ensures that Xw does not assign all weight to a single
prediction (or a group of a.s. identical predictions) but instead attempts to combine information
from multiple different sources. Given that our goal is to analyze and understand aggregation
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of information from different sources, the discussion can safely focus only on the non-trivial
cases. That being said, the next theorem describes a non-trivial Xw in the light of the efficiency
properties of Theorem 2.4.
Theorem 3.2. If Xw is non-trivial, then the following holds.
(i) Xw is marginally consistent: E(Xw) = E(Y ) = µ0.
(ii) Xw is not calibrated: P [E(Y |Xw) 6= Xw] > 0.
(iii) The variance Var (Xw) is too low. More specifically, if X ′′w := E(Y |Xw) is the calibrated
version of Xw, then E(Xw) = E(X ′′w) = µ0 but Var (Xw) < Var (X ′′w). In other words,
Xw is under-confident in a sense that it is, in expectation, closer to the marginal mean µ0
than its calibrated version X ′′w is.
(iv) Xw is not extremizing: Var (Xw) < max(Var (X1), . . . ,Var (XN)). Thus Var (Xw) <
Var (X ′′). In other words, Xw is under-confident in a sense that it is, in expectation,
closer to the marginal mean µ0 than the efficient aggregator X ′′ is.
(v) Xw is inefficient: P(Xw 6= X ′′) > 0.
Item (i) holds as long as each of the individual predictions is marginally consistent. The
other items require calibrated predictions. To discuss these items, recall from Section 2.1 that
calibration is equivalent to Assumption 2.2. Item (ii) then shows that a non-trivial Xw is never
an accurate assessment of any information set about Y even though the individual predictions
are. Instead it distorts the forecasters’ information.
This makes Xw under-confident in two different ways. First, item (iii) defines under-
confidence relative to its calibrated version X ′′w. Intuitively, X ′′w represents an accurate assess-
ment of all information left in Xw. Given that Xw is closer to the non-informative prediction
µ0 = E(Y |F0) than X ′′w is, Xw is not as confident as it could be given all the information it has.
Second, item (iv) defines under-confidence relative to X ′′ and shows that Xw is not as confident
as it should be, given the information it received through the predictions.
Given that Xw is not extemizing or calibrated, it cannot use the forecasters’ information ef-
ficiently under any probability space. This (strong) inefficiency is sometimes believed to arise
because Xw represents the forecasters’ shared information too many times (Kim et al., 2001;
Palley and Soll, 2015). This, however, is not an entirely accurate explanation. In fact, the
following example shows that a non-trivial Xw could benefit from representing shared infor-
mation even more. For the reader’s convenience, all technical derivations of the example have
been deferred to the Appendix.
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Example 3.3. Consider N = 2 predictions of a continuous outcome Y . Suppose without
loss of generality that E(Y ) = µ0 = 0. The setup is described in Figure 1. On the bottom
level are three calibrated interns predicting Y . Suppose their predictions X(1), X(1,2), and X(2)
are independent. On the middle level are two experts. Their private and shared information
are determined by the interns’ predictions. More specifically, for j = 1, 2, the jth expert
predicts Xj = E(Y |X(j), X(1,2)). This way X(j) represents the jth expert’s private informa-
tion and X(1,2) represents the experts’ shared information. In the end, the experts report their
predictions X1 and X2 to a decision-maker who combines them with the weighted average
Xw = w1X1 + w2X2. The objective is to explore how Xw represents the experts’ private and
shared information, namely X(1), X(2), and X(1,2). To make the aggregation task non-trivial,
suppose Var
(
X(1)
)
,Var
(
X(2)
)
> 0 such that P(X1 6= X2) > 0.
The arithmetic mean Xw can be efficient only under some probability space where the
efficient aggregator is linear, that is, X ′′ = β1X1 + β2X2 for some constants β1, β2 ∈ R. If
δj := Var (Xj) and ρ := Cov (X1, X2), then minimizing the expected Bregman loss (such as
the squared error loss) gives βj = (δ1δ2 − ρδi)/(δ1δ2 − ρ2) ≥ 0, where j, i ∈ {1, 2} and j 6= i.
This shows that if the experts’ predictions are independent, then ρ = 0 and X ′′ = X1 + X2.
In other words, simple summing is the efficient way to combine information in independent
predictions.
Given that the interns’ predictions are independent, the jth expert’s prediction can be writ-
ten as Xj = X(j) +X(1,2). Plugging this into the aggregators gives
Xw = w1X(1) + w2X(2) +X(1,2) and (1)
X ′′ = β1X(1) + β2X(2) + (β1 + β2)X(1,2), (2)
where β1 + β2 > 1 (see the Appendix for this result) such that P(Xw 6= X ′′) > 0. This shows
that Xw could be improved by relaxing its sum-constraint.
To understand why, observe that the optimal way to combine the three pieces of informa-
tion, that is, the interns’ predictions is via simple summing:
X ′ := E(Y |X(1), X(2), X(1,2)) = X(1) +X(2) +X(1,2). (3)
This aggregator uses all information that exists in the example and therefore cannot be im-
proved upon. Unfortunately, the decision-maker only has access to the experts’ predictions
and hence cannot separate out the three pieces of information in this manner. Therefore X ′
is not fully attainable in practice. It does, however, offer a theoretical optimum, and every
aggregator should aim to be as close to it as possible.
Comparing (3) to (1) shows that a non-trivial Xw weights the shared information exactly
as it should but under-weights any private information. This shrinks the private information
towards the non-informative prediction E(Y |F0) = µ0 = 0 and makes Xw under-confident in
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X(1) X(1,2) X(2)
X1 X2
Xw
Figure 1: The information flow in Example
3.3. The variables X(1), X(2), and X(1,2) rep-
resent the forecasters’ private and shared in-
formation, respectively.
Figure 2: Comparing the equally-weighted
arithmetic mean and the efficient aggregator.
Information consists of five pieces. From left
to right, Yellow knows the second and third;
Green knows the second and final two; Blue
knows the last and first two.
comparison to X ′. If Xw was not sum-constrained, it could counter this under-confidence by
assigning more weight to each piece of information. This is precisely what X ′′ does.
Comparing (3) to (2) shows thatX ′′ cannot equalX ′ under any fixed β1 and β2. Therefore a
linear aggregator cannot avoid over- or under-weighting some information. This forms a trade-
off between over-weighting shared and under-weighting private information. The efficient
aggregator balances this in a way that brings it as close to X ′ as possible. In fact, X ′′ is the
orthogonal projection of X ′ onto the space of linear aggregators. Even though X ′′ loses due
to over-weighting of the shared information, it is more than compensated for that loss by the
increased weights on the private information. Therefore, perhaps somewhat counter-intuitively,
intentionally over-weighting shared information can be beneficial.
This example illustrates a general challenge in forecast aggregation: private and shared
information in the predictions cannot be separated. Any weight given to Xj is automatically
assigned to both its private and shared components, leading to the shared-to-private information
tradeoff. Figure 2 illustrates this for N = 3 forecasters indexed by different colors. Each
column represents a different piece of information. The height of a colored rectangle is the
weight given to the corresponding forecaster, and the height of the entire column is the weight
that is ultimately assigned to that piece of information. Observe howXw assigns optimal weight
only to information that is known by everyone (second column from the left); everything else
is under-weighted. This is unfortunate because in many contexts the amount of information
known precisely to everyone is likely to shrink as the group of forecasters grows. Consequently,
Xw can end up underweighting a larger and larger share of the forecasters’ information.
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On the flip side, this all suggests that Xw can work well when most of the forecasters’
information is shared. A classic example comes from the 1906 country fair in Plymouth where
787 people guessed the weight of an ox (Galton, 1907). By looking at the ox everyone assessed
roughly the same information. Thus Xw should perform well. It in fact did! The equally
weighted arithmetic mean was 1197 lbs., which is only one pound away from the true weight
of 1198 lbs. There are similar results about estimating the number of jelly beans in a jar
(average = 871, truth = 850), the temperature in a class room (average = 72.4 ◦F, truth = 72.0
◦F), and others (Surowiecki, 2004). In all these cases the forecasters are likely to use very
similar information.
If the forecasters, however, use different information, Xw is likely to be under-confident.
This was observed by the Good Judgment Project (Ungar et al., 2012) that collected thousands
of probability predictions about different future events, ranging from international negotia-
tions and economic shifts to military conflicts and global leadership. For instance, two of the
events were “Will Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi resign, lose re-election/confidence vote, or other-
wise vacate office before 1 January 2012?” and “Will Moody’s issue a new downgrade on the
long-term ratings for any of the eight major French banks between 30 July 2012 and 31 De-
cember 2012?” Such prediction tasks are challenging and require much specific information.
This is likely to cause high variation in the forecasters’ information sets. Consequently, Xw
should be under-confident. In fact, it was! Transforming the equally weighted arithmetic mean
directly away from 0.5 led to significant improvements in its squared error loss (Baron et al.,
2014; Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2014).
3.2 Means
Aside from the arithmetic mean, other common aggregators are the median, midrange, trimmed
means, and other measures of central tendency. These can be expressed as arithmetic means
but the weights would need to depend on the realized values of the predictions. Given that
results in Section 3.1 do not permit such random weights, a different more general analysis is
required. We begin such an analysis with a formal definition of the mean.
Definition 3.4 (Means). A mean X[·] remains between the smallest and largest predictions, that
is, X[·] ∈ [min(X1, . . . , XN),max(X1, . . . , XN)] a.s. The subindex reminds us that X[·] always
stays within the closed convex hull.
This definition poses very little restrictions on the functional form of the aggregator. In
fact, as long as the mean remains between the extreme predictions, it can decide how to treat
the predictions before or after they have been reported. Unfortunately, the next example shows
that this class is not entirely inefficient.
12
Example 3.5. Consider rolling a fair die and predicting the chances of an even number turning
up. This can be described with the following probability space. Suppose Ω = {1, . . . , 6} and
let F = 2Ω be all subsets of Ω. The outcome is Y = 1A, where A = {2, 4, 6}, and P is uniform
over Ω, that is, P(E) = |E|/6 for all E ∈ F . Consider two forecasters with the information
sets F1 = σ({1}) and F2 = σ({6}). For ω ∈ Ω the relevant predictions are
X1(ω) =
{
0 if ω = 1
3/5 otherwise
, X2(ω) =
{
1 if ω = 6
2/5 otherwise
, X ′′ =

0 if X1 = 0
1 if X2 = 1
1/2 otherwise
.
This example shows that X[·] can be efficient if it is allowed to equal the smallest or largest
prediction when the forecasters disagree. If, however, Definition 3.4 is tightened slightly such
that this is not allowed, the class still contains essentially all common aggregators but ineffi-
ciency becomes a class property.
3.3 Strict Means
Motivated by Example 3.5, this section analyses the following class of aggregators.
Definition 3.6 (Strict Means). A strict mean X(·) equals the unanimous prediction if all pre-
dictions agree but if at least two forecasters disagree, then X(·) remains strictly between the
smallest and largest predictions, that is, X(·) ∈ (min(X1, . . . , XN),max(X1, . . . , XN)). The
subindex reminds us thatX(·) stays within the open convex hull when some forecasters disagree.
The strict mean is equivalent to the arithmetic mean with weights that can depend on the
realized values of the predictions but under the constraint that positive weight is assigned to
at least two different predictions when some forecasters disagree. This is still a very general
class of aggregators. For one, given that measures of central tendency aim to summarize the
predictions with a single central value, essentially all of them are strict means. Surely, it is
possible to construct simple examples where this does not hold. For instance, consider three
predictions that can only take on two different values. Every time some of the predictions
disagree, the median and mode equal the minimum or maximum prediction. This is admittedly
a rather contrived example, and for most complex and interesting cases measures of central
tendency can be assumed to be strict means.
The generality of Definition 3.3 is further illustrated by the following enumeration of two
common classes of aggregators that classify as strict means:
(i) Sometimes practitioners are advised to “throw out the high and low predictions” (Arm-
strong, 2001) and use trimmed or Winsorized means instead (Jose and Winkler, 2008).
All such aggregators are strict means.
13
(ii) The quasi-arithmetic mean (a.k.a., f -mean) isXΦ := Φ−1
[∑N
j=1wjΦ(Xj)
]
, where Φ is a
strictly monotonic function from some interval I ⊆ R to R, each wj ≥ 0, and
∑N
j=1wj =
1 (Grabisch et al., 2011). Popular members are the generalized means given by Φ(x) =
xa for some a ∈ R. For instance, the harmonic, geometric, arithmetic, quadratic, and
cubic means correspond respectively to a = −1, 0, 1, 2, 3. Quasi-arithmetic means with
Φ(x) = logit(x) or Φ(x) = probit(x) are also popular in aggregation of probability
predictions Xj ∈ (0, 1) (Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2017). If all weights (random or not) are positive,
these aggregators are strict means.
To analyze the efficiency of strict means, recall a well-known result stating that all σ-fields
and hence all information sets Fj are either finite or uncountable (Davidson, 1994, Theorem
1.20). It turns out to be constructive to analyze strict means under each case separately. First,
we consider finite information sets.
Theorem 3.7 (Inefficiency of the Means). Suppose |Fj| < ∞ for all j = 1, . . . , N . If at
least two predictions disagree with positive probability, then X(·) is inefficient. In other words,
P(X(·) 6= X ′′) > 0 as long as P(Xi 6= Xj) > 0 for some pair i 6= j.
(Remark. This result can be made somewhat more general because its proof only requires X(·)
to remain within either pre-specified half-open convex hull of the predictions. Given that this
minor generalization hardly adds anything to the discussion, it is only mentioned but excluded
from the final theorem for the sake of clarity.)
Similarly to before, some forecasters are required to differ such that the problem is non-
trivial and aggregation of information from different sources is necessary for achieving effi-
ciency. Given how general Definition 3.6 is, detailed results akin to Theorem 3.2 can be hardly
expected. Therefore it is important to emphasize that Theorem 3.7 simply states that X(·) does
not use the forecasters’ information efficiently as long as at least two forecasters differ. Thus
X(·) distorts or leaves some information unused. Combining this with the efficiency properties
in Theorem 2.4 explains that if X(·) is calibrated, it is not extremizing (and vice versa).
Unfortunately, as the next example illustrates, inefficiency does not need to hold under
uncountably large information sets.
Example 3.8. Consider N = 2 forecasters predicting an unknown proportion that is uniformly
distributed over the unit interval. This can be described with the standard probability space
(Ω,F ,P), where Ω = [0, 1], F holds all the Borel subsets B([0, 1]), and P is the Lebesgue
measure on [0, 1]. The target proportion is defined as Y (ω) = ω for all ω ∈ Ω.
Suppose the forecasters are better at predicting proportions near zero and one. To form their
information sets, pick two strictly increasing sequences τ1 = {ak : k ∈ Z} and τ2 = {bk : k ∈
Z} such that both ak and bk converge to 0 as k → −∞ and to 1 as k → ∞. Suppose further
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Figure 3: The partitions τ1 and τ2 generate the forecasters’ information F1 and F2. Together
they form the partition τ ′′ that generates the forecasters’ combined information F ′′. Under
Lebesgue measure the predictions are the middle points of each interval. For instance, if ω =
0.6 (the dashed line), then predictions are the points on the graph. Observe how X ′′ is strictly
between X1 and X2 under each ω ∈ [0, 1].
that the sequences alternate in magnitude such that ak < bk < ak+1 < bk+1 for all k ∈ Z. For
instance, one can let
τ1 =
{
1
2
±
(
1
6
− γk
3
)
: k ∈ N
}
and τ2 =
{
1
2
,
1
2
± γk
4
: k ∈ N
}
, (4)
where γk =
∑k
j=0
(
1
2
)j → 2 as k →∞. These sequences are illustrated in Figure 3.
Any such sequences τ1 and τ2 define two countably infinite partitions of Ω. The atoms
of these partitions accumulate only at the extremes, and no atom in one partition is contained
within an atom in the other partition. The jth forecaster’s information set Fj is then generated
from the partition defined by τj . This computes all possible unions of the atoms. The result is
an uncountably infinite information set because it has the same cardinality as the power set of
a countably infinite set. Similarly, the forecasters’ combined information F ′′ is generated by
the partition τ ′′ = τ1 ∪ τ2 = {. . . , a−1, b−1, a0, b0, a1, b1, . . . }.
The predictions X1, X2, and X ′′ equal the middle points of those atoms to which the real-
ized ω ∈ Ω belongs. In other words, if ω ∈ [aj, aj+1] ∩ [bi, bi+1], then
X1 = (aj + aj+1)/2, X2 = (bi + bi+1)/2, X ′′ =
{
(bi + aj+1)/2 if aj < bi
(bi+1 + aj)/2 if aj > bi
. (5)
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Given the way the values of τ1 and τ2 alternate, X ′′ is always strictly between X1 and X2. This
shows that X(·) (and hence X[·]) can be efficient if the forecasters’ information sets are allowed
to be uncountably large.
Under the specific sequences (4), the efficient aggregator (5) becomes
X ′′ =
{
2
3
min(X1, X2) +
1
3
max(X1, X2) if X2 < 0.5
1
3
min(X1, X2) +
2
3
max(X1, X2) if X2 > 0.5
.
This is an arithmetic mean but the weights depend on the realized values of the predictions. In
particular, a weight of 2/3 is given to the prediction that is closer to the nearest extreme value
(at 0.0 or 1.0). Compared to the equally weighted arithmetic mean (X1 +X2)/2, the aggregator
X ′′ is further away from the marginal mean µ0 = E(Xj) = 0.5 and hence more confident.
Given that the inefficiency of the means (Theorem 3.7) does not need to hold under un-
countably large information sets, it is natural to ask whether such sets even exist in the real
world. The answer is “no” because information content is finite in the physical world (Hib-
bard, 2014). In fact, according to Lloyd (2002), the observable universe has a finite information
capacity of at most 10120 bits. Even if the universe did contain infinite information, forecasters
could not process it. Computers have finite memory and represent the world in a discrete form.
Similarly, the human cognition is limited in its ability to process information. Therefore, even
though a forecaster with infinite information may be a convenient approximation in some theo-
retical work, it is not a precise description of reality. Casella and Berger (2002) even argue that
in practice |Ω| < ∞ (and hence |Fj| < ∞ for all j) because measurements cannot be made
with infinite precision. Either way, we conclude that (strict) means can be efficient aggregators
of calibrated predictions in theory but not in practice.
It may be that under some additional restrictions on the predictions and outcome the entire
class of means is inefficient. Given, however, that we begun with the most general hypothesis
“all means are inefficient” and then justified each necessary specification with a concrete ex-
ample, we believe that Theorem 3.7 is very close, if not equal, to the most general version of
the inefficiency of the means.
4. AGGREGATING NOISY PREDICTIONS
4.1 Asymptotic Efficiency
So far our results have depended on the predictions being calibrated. This section, however,
shows that the results can shed light even upon contexts where predictions are not calibrated.
The lack of calibration here is achieved by adding noise to the calibrated predictions. This way
each prediction can be described as a distribution with the center at the calibrated prediction.
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If these noisy predictions are aggregated with a similar notion of centrality, then intuitively the
aggregator should converge to a central point of the calibrated predictions and hence not be
(asymptotically) efficient.
To verify this intuition, denote the jth noisy prediction with
X˜j = Q [E(Y |Fj), j] , (6)
where Q(·, ·) is a deterministic function that adds i.i.d. error j to the calibrated prediction
E(Y |Fj). For instance, if Y is real-valued, one can simply let Q(x, y) = x + y, giving X˜j =
E(Y |Fj) + j .
To conduct asymptotic analysis, we must describe how the group of forecasters grows.
First, recall from Section 3.3 that in practice |Ω| < ∞. The principal σ-field F is then finite
and all of its sub-σ-fields can be collected into a finite set H = {H1,H2, . . . ,HI} = {σ(H) :
H ⊆ F}. Let theFjs be i.i.d. draws fromH with pi := P(Fj = Hi). Now, by Borel-Cantelli II
(Durrett, 2010, Theorem 2.3.6.), σ(F1,F2, . . . ) a.s.→ σ(Hi : pi > 0) as N →∞. An aggregator
X is then asymptotically efficient if and only if X a.s.→ E[Y |σ(Hi : pi > 0)].
Now, denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of X˜j|(Fj = Hi) with F˜i. The
noisy predictions are then i.i.d. draws from the mixture distribution F˜ =
∑I
i=1 piF˜i. Describe
the notion of centrality with a statistical functional T (·) that T (F˜i) = E(Y |Hi). In words, T
recovers the calibrated prediction from the distribution of its noisy version. Lastly, denote the
support of a random variable X with supp(X) = {t : P(X = t) > 0}. With this notation,
assume the following:
Assumption 4.1. pi, pi′ > 0 and P[E(Y |Hi) 6= E(Y |Hi′)] > 0 for some i 6= i′.
Assumption 4.2. Let X ∼ F and X ′ ∼ F ′. If P(X ≤ t) > P(X ′ ≤ t) for all t ∈ supp(X), or
P(X ′ ≥ t) > P(X ≥ t) for all t ∈ supp(X ′), then T (F ) < T (F ′)
Assumption 4.3. If x < y, then Q(x, ) < Q(y, ) for all values of .
These conditions are intuitive and rather mild. Assumption 4.1 ensures that the aggregation
problem is non-trivial. Assumption 4.2 states that moving density of a distribution uniformly to
one direction (left or right) strictly changes the functional value in the same direction. Assump-
tion 4.3, on the other hand, says that the prediction increases if the forecaster “aims” higher but
keeps the same level of error.
This all leads to the following corollary.
Corollary 4.4. Consider an aggregator that X a.s.→ T (F˜ ). If assumptions (4.1) to (4.3) hold,
thenX converges a.s. to a strict mean of the E(Y |Hi)s and hence is not asymptotically efficient.
17
Corollary 4.4 applies only if the aggregator X is strongly consistent for T (F˜ ). This holds,
for instance, if X = T (Fˆ ), where Fˆ is the empirical CDF of the X˜js, and T is Lipschitz
in a sense that |T (F ) − T (G)| ≤ K||F − G||∞, where 0 < K < ∞ and ||F − G||∞ =
supx |F (x)−G(x)| is the Kolmogorov metric (Wassermann, 2006, Exercise 2.7.5, p. 24). As
long as the forecasters do not always either under- or overestimate the calibrated prediction,
this plug-in estimator T (Fˆ ) can be seen to classify as a mean.
To conclude, we illustrate Corollary 4.4 under the arithmetic mean Xw and a simple model
of noisy predictions. This assumes that X˜j = E(Y |Fj) + j , where the js are i.i.d. with
E(j) = 0. Thus T (F ) is the expected value. Let wj = bj/BN , where b1, b2, . . . is a sequence
of positive values and BN :=
∑N
j=1 bj → ∞ as N → ∞. This way each wj is positive but
decreases in N . Now, consider the counting function γ(t) = #{N ≥ 1 : BN/bN ≤ t}. Then
Xw a.s.→ T (F˜ ) if and only if lim supt→∞ γ(t)/t < ∞ (Jamison et al., 1965). For instance, if
wj = 1/N for all j = 1, . . . , N , then γ(t) = btc and lim supt→∞ γ(t)/t = 1, returning the
strong law of large numbers (Durrett, 2010, Theorem 2.4.1., p. 73). If this condition holds in
our example, then Xw a.s.→ T (F˜ ) =
∑I
i=1 piE(Y |Hi). This means that, by assumption (4.1), Xw
converges a.s. to a non-trivial arithmetic mean of the E(Y |Hj)s and hence, by Theorem 3.2, is
not asymptotically efficient (or even calibrated or extremizing).
This example suggests a crucial conflict between means and information aggregation. The
arithmetic mean Xw converges to a typical (defined here in terms of the expected value) cali-
brated prediction. Statisticians often use means as references for the typical (Weisberg, 1992).
Information aggregation, however, is not about estimating a typical prediction; it is about es-
timating the calibrated prediction that a forecaster with all of the group’s information would
make. This prediction, of course, does not have to be typical. In fact, the individual predic-
tions may not ever come close to it. This way information aggregation and summarizing the
distribution of a sample with a typical value can be seen to be very different exercises.
5. DISCUSSION
Since its beginning statistics has been about studying variability (Weisberg, 1992). Of particu-
lar interest is to understand how individual observations vary around some unknown quantity
of interest. The statistician then models this variability and derives an aggregator that can
combine the observations into an accurate estimate of the target quantity.
Historically the most common model of variability can be illustrated with a sensitive in-
strument that repeatedly estimates some target quantity. Here low variability is associated with
better accuracy. Deviations represent idiosyncratic error, and the estimates are treated as draws
from a distribution with the center at the target quantity. Depending how this center is defined,
the target quantity is often estimated with some mean of the observations. The idea is that
through aggregation the errors in the “too high” estimates will cancel out the errors in the “too
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low” estimates, leaving a low error estimate of the target quantity. This way means can be seen
as mechanisms for error reduction (Plackett, 1958).
As the world faces increasingly complex forms of data, existing models of variability must
be occasionally revisited and any shortcomings addressed. For instance, estimates do not al-
ways come from a single instrument anymore. The current crowdsourcing technology allows
decision-makers to easily and cheaply ask a large number of people for their predictions about
some future event. These forecasters may have different information, making their predic-
tions very different. Of course, they may make errors in estimating their ideal predictions but
such errors represent lack of skill – a concept that is very different from information (see, e.g.,
Chamorro-Premuzic et al. 2015). Here it is not enough to just reduce error. Instead the aggre-
gator must be able to make sense of the information among the forecasters and combine it into
a consensus prediction.
This paper showed that (strict) means cannot make sense of the forecasters’ information
even if the forecasters accurately assess their own information and hence report calibrated
predictions. To explain this intuitively, recall from Section 2.2 that efficient aggregators of
calibrated predictions associate higher variability with higher levels of information content.
These aggregators aim to capture all of the forecasters’ information into a consensus that is
more informed and hence more variable than the individual predictions. They hence have a
tendency towards the extremes. Means, however, do the opposite: they tend towards a central
location and aim to reduce variability that is perceived as lack of accuracy. This contrasting
tendency and opposing interpretation of variability is an easily understood explanation of the
inefficiency of the means.
If essentially all means are inefficient, a natural question to ask is whether an efficient
aggregator of calibrated predictions even exists in practice. Fortunately, the answer is “yes.”
One solution is to assume a parametric model for calibrated predictions and then find X ′′ by
either analytically or numerically under the chosen model. Of course, choosing a probability
model in a given context requires a certain amount of field expertise. If such expertise is not
available, one can work with a generic model such as the Gaussian partial information model
(Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2017). This model brings the partial information framework (Section 2.1) to
practice by only assuming Gaussianity – nothing else.
In practice, however, forecast variation is likely to be driven by error and information, like
in (6). On one hand, means can reduce error but not aggregate information (Section 4). On
the other hand, aggregators based on the partial information framework interpret all variation
as information. Consequently, they will overfit to error. This motivates some of our current
work-in-progress to develop an aggregator that mimics the behavior of a smoothing spline: the
aggregate is a compromise between error and information. That is, depending on what portion
of the variability is due to error, the aggregator can take on different forms between a mean
and a partial information aggregator. The preliminary results look promising but much more
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development and testing is needed.
The purpose of this paper was not to criticize the existing literature on the aggregation
properties of the means (see, e.g., Lichtendahl Jr et al. 2013). Instead our goal is to direct
researchers’ attention towards the type of variability that is present among predictions and
hence inspire new research in forecast aggregation.
In terms of practice, we hope that care is taken in matching the aggregator with the fore-
casting context. Our work explains that error and information motivate very different forms of
aggregation. Applying one type of aggregation to a wrong type of forecast variability yields
sub-optimal performance. As an analogy, this is like making conclusions based on a linear re-
gression model when the true underlying relationship is not linear. One must always consider
how the assumptions behind the statistical techniques align with the data. This is no different
when it comes to aggregating predictions.
A. APPENDIX: PROOFS AND TECHNICAL DETAILS
A.1 Proof of Theorem 2.4
⇒ Assume that X ′′ is efficient.
(i) Given that X ′′ = E(Y |F ′′), we have σ(X ′′) ⊆ F ′′. The law of total expectation then
gives E(Y |X ′′) = E[E(Y |F ′′)|X ′′] = E(X ′′|X ′′) = X ′′.
(ii) Let Xv = E(Y |Xj, j ∈ v) for some subset v ⊆ {1, . . . , N}. Then σ(Xv) = Fv ⊆ F ′′ =
σ(X1, . . . , XN). By Satopa¨a¨ et al. (2017, Proposition 2.1.), item (i), and the Cauchy-
Schwarz inequality, we have that Var (Xv) = Cov (Xv,X ′′) ≤
√
Var (X ′′)Var (Xv).
Squaring and diving both sides by Var (Xv) gives the final result.
⇐Assume that an aggregator X satisfies properties (i) and (ii). By definition of the aggregator,
X ∈ F ′′ such that G := σ(X ) ⊆ F ′′. Then X = E(Y |G) = E[E(Y |F ′′)|G] = E(X ′′|X ). Thus
X is also calibrated for X ′′. Now, by property (ii), Var (X ′′) ≤ Var (X ). But given that
G ⊆ F ′′, Var (X ) ≤ Var (X ′′) (Satopa¨a¨ et al., 2017, Proposition 2.1.). Thus Var (X ′′) =
Var (X )⇔ E [X ′′2] = E [X 2]. From Durrett 2010, Exercise 5.1.11, it follows that X = X ′′ a.s.
A.2 Proof of Theorem 3.2
(i) Let w = (w1, . . . , wN)′ and X = (X1, . . . , XN)′. Then, E(Xw) = E(w′X) = w′E(X) =
µ0w
′1N = µ0.
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(ii) This and the next item are are generalizations of the proof in Ranjan and Gneiting (2010)
who consider calibrated predictions of a binary outcome.
Proof by contradiction: Suppose that a non-trivial Xw is calibrated. For any calibrated
prediction (aggregate or individual) X , we have that E[(Y −X)2] = E(Y 2)−E(X2). For
Xw this is
E
[
(Y −w′X)2
]
= E

[
N∑
j=1
wj(Y −Xj)
]2
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
(
Y 2 − Y Xi − Y Xj +XjXi
)
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
[
E
(
Y 2|Xi
)− E (Y Xi|Xi)− E (Y Xj|Xj) +XjXi]
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
[
E
(
Y 2|Xi
)−XjXi − (Xi −Xj)2]
=
N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
[
E
(
Y 2|Xi
)−XjXi]− N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
[
(Xi −Xj)2
]
=
[
E
(
Y 2
)− E (X 2w)]− N∑
i=1
N∑
j=1
wiwjE
[
(Xi −Xj)2
]
.
The double sum on the final line is strictly positive because Xw is non-trivial. This means
that Xw cannot be calibrated, giving us a contradiction. Thus P[Xw 6= E(Y |Xw)] > 0.
(iii) Given that X ′′w is calibrated, E(X ′′w) = µ0 and E[(Y −X ′′w)2] = E(Y 2)−E(X ′′2w ). Item (ii)
shows that Xw is not calibrated. Thus P(X ′′w 6= Xw) > 0 such that E[(X ′′w − Xw)2] > 0.
This all gives us
E
[
(Y −Xw)2
]
= E
[
Y 2 + 2
(X ′′2w −X ′′2w )− 2Y Xw + X 2w]
= E
[
(Y −X ′′w)2
]
+ E
[
(Xw −X ′′w)2
]
= E(Y 2)− E(X ′′2w ) + E
[
(Xw −X ′′w)2
]
> E(Y 2)− E(X ′′2w ).
Furthermore, from the proof of item (ii), E
[
(Y −Xw)2
]
< E(Y 2)− E(X 2w). Combining
this with the above inequality gives the final result:
E(Y 2)− E(X ′′2w ) < E(Y 2)− E(X 2w)
21
⇔ E(X ′′2w )− µ20 > E(X 2w)− µ20
⇔ Var (X ′′w) > Var (X 2w).
(iv) First, consider two calibrated predictions Xi and Xj . If Corr (Xi, Xj) = 1, then Xi and
Xj are linearly dependent and Fi = σ(Xi) = σ(Xj) = Fj . Thus, it must be the case
that Xi = Xj a.s. On the other hand, if Xi = Xj a.s., then clearly Corr (Xi, Xj) = 1.
Thus Corr (Xi, Xj) = 1 if and only if Xi = Xj a.s. Now, let m = arg maxj Var (Xj)
identify the prediction with the maximal variance. Given that Xw is non-trivial, there is
some pair i 6= j such that P(Xi 6= Xj) > 0 and wi, wj > 0. For these forecasters,
Corr (Xi 6= Xj) < 1 such that Cov (Xi, Xj) <
√
Var (Xi)Var (Xj) ≤ Var (Xm). Now,
given that the maximum element in Cov (X) is Var (Xm) and
∑
i,j wiwj = 1, we have
that Var (Xw) =
∑
i,j wiwjCov (Xi, Xj) < Var (Xm).
(v) Proof by contradiction: Assume that Xw is efficient such that Xw = X ′′ a.s. Property (iv),
however, gives a contradiction. Thus P(Xw 6= X ′′) > 0.
A.3 Technical Details of Example 3.3
Let X = (X1, . . . , XN)′. If E(Xj) = E(Y ) = 0 and Cov (X) := Σ, it is well-known that
arg minb∈RN E(Y − b′X)2 = Cov (X, Y )Σ−1 =: β , where Cov (X, Y ) = (Cov (X1, Y ), . . . ,
Cov (XN , Y )). Satopa¨a¨ et al. (2017) show that ifXj is calibrated, then Cov (Xj, Y ) = Var (Xj)
and hence β = diag(Σ)Σ−1. If Cov (Xj, Xi) = 0 for all i 6= j, then Σ = diag(Σ), β = 1′N ,
and βX =
∑N
j=1 Xj . Thus information from independent sources combines via simple sum-
ming.
If N = 2, δj = Var (Xj), and ρ = Cov (X1, X2), then β = (β1, β2) = diag(Σ)Σ−1 =
(δ1δ2−ρδ2, δ2δ2−ρδ1)/(δ1δ2−ρ2). Given that δj = Var (X(j))+Var (X(1,2)) > Var (X(1,2)) =
ρ, it follows that ρ < min(δ1, δ2) and hence that βj > 0. Now, β1 + β2 = (2δ1δ2 − ρδ1 −
ρδ2)/(δ1δ2 − ρ2) and
∂
∂ρ
(β1 + β2) = −δ2(δ1 − ρ)
2 + δ1(δ2 − ρ)2
(ρ2 − δ1δ2)2 < 0.
Thus the sum β1 + β2 is a strictly decreasing function of ρ. Suppose without loss of generality
that δ1 ≤ δ2. Then,
β1 + β2 > (β1 + β2)|ρ=δ1 =
2δ1δ2 − δ21 − δ1δ2
δ1δ2 − δ21
= 1.
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Observe that Var (Xw −X ′′) = (w1− β1)2Var (X(1)) + (w2− β2)2Var (X(2)) + (1− β1−
β2)
2Var (X(1,2)). As β1 +β2 > 1, we have that w1 6= β1 or w2 6= β2. Given that Var (X(1)) > 0
and Var (X(2)) > 0, we have that Var (Xw −X ′′) > 0 and hence P(Xw 6= X ′′) > 0.
Finally, to show that X ′′ is the orthogonal projection of X ′ onto the space of all aggrega-
tors of the form β1X1 +β2X2, recall that arg minb∈RN E(Y −b′X)2 = Cov (X,X ′)Σ−1. Now,
Cov (Xj,X ′) = Cov (X(j)+X(1,2), X(j)+X(i)+X(1,2)) = Cov (X(j), X(j))+Cov (X(1,2), X(1,2))
= Var (Xj). Thus Cov (X,X ′)Σ−1 = diag(Σ)Σ−1 as desired.
A.4 Proof of Theorem 3.7
Proof by contradiction: Suppose the efficient aggregator X ′′ is a.s. a strict mean. Recall from
Section 2.1 thatFj = σ(Xj) = {{ω ∈ Ω : Xj(ω) ∈ B} : B ∈ R}. Given that the Borel σ-field
R is countably generated (Durrett, 2010, Exercise 1.1.4., p. 9), Fj is also countably generated
(Durrett, 2010, Exercise 1.3.1., p. 16). Furthermore, as |Fj| < ∞, there is a finite partition
Aj = {A1j, A2j, . . . , Anjj} of Ω such that Fj = σ(Aj) for all j = 1, . . . , N . The forecasters’
combined information is F ′′ = σ (∪Nj=1Fj) = σ(B′′), where B′′ := {B1, . . . , Bn′′} = {B :
B 6= ∅, B = ∩Nj=1Aj, Aj ∈ Aj} is a partition of Ω. This partition is finite n′′ < ∞ because
nj < ∞ for all j = 1, . . . , N . Given that each B ∈ B′′ is contained in only one atom per
Aj , the Xjs and X ′′ remain constant within each atom of B′′. If Xj or X ′′ is constant over
some atom C, then denote the prediction with Xj(C) or X ′′(C), respectively. Lastly, define
B′′+ := {B ∈ B′′ : P(B) > 0}.
By construction, each Aij ∈ Aj can be written as a unique union of some atoms in B′′.
Furthermore, given that Xj = E(Y |Fj), we have, for any atom Aij ∈ Aj such that P(Aij) > 0,∫
Aij
Y dP =
∫
Aij
XjdP = Xj(Aij)
∫
Aij
dP = Xj(Aij)P(Aij)
⇔ Xj(Aij) =
∫
Aij
Y dP
P(Aij)
=
∑
k:Bk∩Aij 6=∅
∫
Bk
Y dP
P(Aij)
=
∑
k:Bk∩Aij 6=∅X ′′(Bk)P(Bk)
P(Aij)
⇔ Xj(Aij) =
∑
k:Bk∩Aij 6=∅
pijkX ′′(Bk), (7)
where pijk = P(Bk)/P(Aij) and
∑
k:Bk∩Aij 6=∅ pijk = 1. This expresses every value of Xj as a
convex combination of some values of X ′′.
Given that the Xjs and X ′′ are integrable, they must be finite over all atoms B ∈ B′′+.
Suppose for now that there is a pair i 6= j such that Xi(B) 6= Xj(B) for some B ∈ B′′+. We
can then define two different indices k∗ := arg minj{Xj(B)} and k∗∗ := arg maxj{Xj(B)}.
Given that, over this atom, the predictions do not all agree, the strict mean X ′′ is in the interior
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of their convex hull:
Xk∗(B) < X ′′(B) < Xk∗∗(B)
⇔
∑
k:Bk∩Aik∗ 6=∅,B∩Aik∗ 6=∅
pik∗kX ′′(Bk) < X ′′(B) <
∑
k:Bk∩Aik∗∗ 6=∅,B∩Aik∗∗ 6=∅
pik∗∗kX ′′(Bk),
where the second step follows from (7). Both sums on the last line include X ′′(B). Further-
more, in order for the inequalities to hold, there must be a set Bl ∈ B′′+ in the left sum and a set
Br ∈ B′′+ in the right sum such that
X ′′(Bl) < X ′′(B) < X ′′(Br). (8)
These setsBl andBr are connected toB via some atoms inAk∗ andAk∗∗ , that is,B∪Bl ⊆ Aik∗
and B ∪Br ⊆ Aik∗∗ for some Aik∗ ∈ Ak∗ and Aik∗∗ ∈ Ak∗∗ .
Now, define B(1) := {B ∈ B′′+ : X ′′(B) = min{X ′′(B∗) : B∗ ∈ B′′+}}. If some of the
predictions disagree on aB ∈ B(1), inequality (8) shows that there is aB′ ∈ B′′+ withX ′′(B′) <
X ′′(B). By definition of B(1), this is a contradiction. Assume then that the predictions agree
over the atoms in B(1). In such a case, the strict mean X ′′ is equal to the unanimous prediction.
This is possible only if each Bk in the sum (7) is either Bk ∈ B(1) or P(Bk) = 0; otherwise
the corresponding X ′′(Bk) would enter the sum with positive weight and hence make it larger
than the unanimous prediction. Thus B(1) is a disjoint set in a sense that there is no Aij such
that B ∪B′ ⊆ Aij for some B ∈ B(1) and B′ ∈ B′′+ \ B(1).
Next, define B(2) := {B ∈ B′′+ : X ′′(B) = min{X ′′(B∗) : B∗ ∈ B′′+ \ B(1)}}. Analyze
B(2) similarly to the above analysis of B(1). In particular, if the predictions disagree on some
B ∈ B(2), inequality (8) leads to a contradiction because there is no Aij and B′ ∈ B′′+ such that
X ′′(B′) < X ′′(B) and B ∪B′ ⊆ Aij . If, on the other hand, all predictions agree, then B(2) is a
disjoint set just like B(1).
Repeat this process for B(3),B(4), . . . , and find the first set B(k) with an atom on which
some forecasters disagree. Such a set must exist because at least two forecasters are assumed
to disagree with positive probability. This then gives the final contradiction, and it can be
concluded that P(X(·) 6= X ′′) > 0.
A.5 Proof of Corollary 4.4
Given that |Ω| < ∞, we can write P(A) = ∑ω∈A p(ω), where A ∈ F , p(ω) ≥ 0, and∑
ω∈Ω p(ω) = 1. In addition, given that
∑
ω∈Ω |E(Y |Hi)(ω)|p(ω) = E[|E(Y |Hi)|] < ∞, the
prediction E(Y |Hi) is a.s. finite for all i = 1, . . . , I . Therefore LX := min({E(Y |Hi) : Hi ∈
H and pi > 0}) and MX := max({E(Y |Hi) : Hi ∈ H and pi > 0}) are also a.s. finite.
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First, define a random variable  that has the same distribution as each idiosyncratic error
j . Second, for a given x, let F˜x := P(Q(x, ) ≤ t) and F˜ ∗x := P(Q(x, ) ≥ t). This way each
X˜j ∼ F˜ =
∑I
i=1 F˜E(Y |Hi)pi. By assumption (4.3), for any x < y there exists some random
variable δ > 0 such that F˜y(t) = P(Q(y, ) ≤ t) = P(Q(x, )+δ ≤ t) = P(Q(x, ) ≤ t−δ) <
P(Q(x, ) ≤ t) = F˜x(t) with t ∈ supp(F˜x) = {t : P(Q(x, ) = t) > 0}. On the other hand, for
all t ∈ supp(F˜y), we have that F˜ ∗y (t) = P(Q(y, ) ≥ t) = P(Q(x, ) ≥ t − δ) > P(Q(x, ) ≥
t) = F˜ ∗x (t).
Next, consider the event A0 = {E(Y |Hi) = E(Y |H) for someH ∈ H and all pi >
0} ⊆ Ω. Under this event, each X˜j = Q(E(Y |H), j) and X → E(Y |H). Assumption
4.1, however, ensures that the complement P(Ac0) > 0. In other words, with positive prob-
ability there exist some i 6= i′ such that E(Y |Hi) 6= E(Y |Hi′) and pi, pi′ > 0. Thus, for
each ω ∈ Ac0, LX < E(Y |Hi) and E(Y |Hi′) < MX for some i, i′. Consequently, F˜ (t) =∑I
i=1 F˜E(Y |Hi)(t)pi <
∑I
i=1 F˜LX (t)pi = F˜LX (t) for all t ∈ supp(F˜LX ), and F˜ ∗MX (t) =∑I
i=1 F˜
∗
MX
(t)pi >
∑I
i=1 F˜
∗
E(Y |Hi)(t)pi = F˜
∗(t) for all t ∈ supp(F˜MX ). Now, by Assump-
tion 4.2, LX = T (F˜LX ) < T (F˜ ) < T (F˜MX ) = MX . Consequently, X → T (F˜ ) ∈ (LX ,MX)
under Ac0. Putting this together shows that X is asymptotically a strict mean of the calibrated
predictions E(Y |Hi). Given that all |Fj| < ∞, by Theorem 3.7, X is not asymptotically
efficient.
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